Better tactics, fewer losses: Russia's very slow Donbas advance
Russia's artillery advantage is hard to overcome, but still insufficient for long-term success
I haven’t written on Ukraine since late April, in part because the war proceeded much as expected: I think the last analysis had a good run.
Now, however, it’s time for an update, thanks to a few recent changes, ones which generally favor Russia. They do not offer much hope for a long-term Russian victory, but signal more success in the Donbas than I expected. Ukraine may also have more trouble with a counter-offensive than Igor Girkin’s analysis, to which I generally subscribed, would imply.
Russia has a quantitative artillery advantage
The battle in the Donbas is an artillery battle. Russia has resumed its tactics from the Chechen wars, having failed in its ambitious but half-baked attempt to emulate the Gulf War instead (Russian generals were deeply impressed by the Gulf War, it’s one of the biggest influences on post-Soviet doctrine). Russia has made slow, cautious advances behind a steady artillery barrage. In some areas, Russian artillery has forced Ukraine to withdraw south of the Siverskiy Donets River.
Ukrainian artillery has been very effective in the war so far; at Kyiv, most Russian armored losses came at the hands of Ukrainian artillery strikes, not anti-tank missiles. But the smaller area involved in the Donbas campaign has made it far easier for Russia to concentrate artillery. There are also lots of rail lines in the region, including one from Belgorod that Ukraine hasn’t been able to cut. This makes it easy for Russia to resupply ammunition and replace destroyed artillery pieces. And Russia has more than enough artillery, including plenty of long-range but unguided rocket systems. Ukraine, meanwhile, claims to have run out of Soviet-era shells and is now relying on Western ammunition. A report from the Washington Post, quoting Oleksandr Danyluk, an advisor to Zelesnky, claimed that Russia is firing up to ten times as many shells per day as Ukraine.
Severodonetsk probably can’t hold
Russia will likely manage to take Severodonetsk, a city of 100,000 at the far eastern end of the Donbas salient Ukraine is defending. Right now, Russia controls about two-thirds of the city. Severodonetsk is difficult to defend because it lies east of the Siverskiy Donets. It’s connected to Lysychansk, on the west bank, by three bridges. Russia has already destroyed two, making it hard either to reinforce the city or to withdraw troops. (The third may have been destroyed as well, it’s not yet clear to me.)
Ukraine has had some success in defending the city, initially withdrawing and then mounting a counter-attack once Russia entered. This caused heavy Russian losses. Ukraine can also easily shell Russian positions from higher ground in Lysychansk; the west bank of the Donets overlooks the city. But it will ultimately prove indefensible.
Ukrainian losses make a counteroffensive harder
Ukraine is suffering severe losses—possibly more losses than Russia. Early in the campaign, Russia was losing at least 50% more troops than Ukraine. Now, though, I think Ukraine is probably losing more. In the long term, it won’t matter, because Ukraine has more reserves: unless Russia mobilizes, Ukraine has the manpower advantage.
But manpower is not helpful without training, and Ukraine can’t train those forces quickly enough. Ukraine is losing a lot of trained troops, and is thus forced to replace them with inexperienced and poorly-prepared fighters. Russia has the same problem, but Ukraine previously had an advantage here; now less so.
This also makes an eventual counter-offensive harder. Ukraine’s first priority is probably Kherson (or else an offensive northeast of Kharkiv, but that would require a Donets crossing). Girkin, as you may recall, thought Ukraine had a long-term advantage because it could properly train and arm a reserve force to mount an offensive wherever Russian lines were weakest, perhaps in late summer. On paper, this is true. Ukraine does not lack recruits, and with 250 T-72s from Poland, it can create the mechanized force necessary for a proper combined arms offensive even in the flat steppes of the Kherson region.
But that’s only possible if the troops can be trained in time, which Ukraine is struggling to do. They certainly can’t be trained in time if Ukraine feels obligated to send them to the front piecemeal and prematurely to replace losses. Present casualties are so problematic for Ukraine because they threaten the ability to create a proper reserve.
The West can’t send enough artillery
Ukraine is calling for more Western weapons, notably HIMARS rocket systems (some of which will be delivered by the US and UK). Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Zelensky, recently claimed that Ukraine needs the following to achieve “heavy weapons parity”:
He’s right. Unfortunately, his request is impossible. The US only has 1000 M777 howitzers (155mm), and has already sent 120. So he’s asking for the entire US arsenal. We have over 1000 MLRS systems, so in this case he’s asking for about 25%--still not really possible. We could send another 200 tanks, probably, if Germany finally cooperates, but no more.
There are two problems here. First, Ukraine is not fighting an American-style war. We don’t have that much artillery because we have a functioning air force. America uses aircraft for strike missions; Ukraine and Russia are both forced to rely heavily on artillery, instead.
This problem has an answer: begin training Ukrainian pilots on Western aircraft (F-16s, this would also be a great opportunity to finally get rid of the obsolete A-10). I hope this is already happening; rumours crop up from time to time claiming that it is. If not, there is no time to lose. We simply cannot offer the kind of support Ukraine needs for a clean victory in an artillery war. Guided MLRS systems will help—a lot—but may not be enough, and Ukraine may also have trouble using and maintaining them effectively. (They’ve already run into problems maintaining Western equipment—Poland is helping.) The US and the UK can send at least a few dozen, though (right now we have promised fewer than 10).
The second problem is more worrying: American defense manufacturing capacity is insufficient. Ideally, we could ramp up production of all these systems at once, outpacing Russian stocks and easily arming Ukraine. But we just don’t have the ability to manufacture enough advanced systems quickly. (This problem is especially notable for Stinger missiles; Raytheon says they can’t restart Stinger production for at least a year because of outdated electronics in the missiles.)
Now, Russia can’t manufacture weapons either—in fact, they have almost no ability at all to replace air or armor losses. But imagine a future war with China, in which the US might suffer heavy losses. Could we replace those as easily as China? I doubt it. Aircraft, maybe—we have the reserves—but ships, artillery, or missiles (including air-to-air missiles)? I think China has a notable advantage here. The US needs much better contingency plans for an eventual rapid increase in weapons production—and more shipyards, too.
All this makes a slow, grinding war more likely, while raising the possibility of a short-term Russian conventional victory in parts of the Donbas. As Russian attrition declines, domestic pressure on Putin may hold steady, too, allowing him to proceed on his present course for a while longer before having to seriously consider the options discussed before—general mobilization, nuclear escalation, or withdrawal. I’d also say the odds of success with general mobilization have gone up, should this turn into a long-term artillery war, even if a complete victory remains impossible.
At the same time, there’s little reason to expect Russia’s advance to continue indefinitely. Severodonetsk is a tiny part of a large salient, and Ukraine has defended the south and west banks of the Donets very well, inflicting heavy losses on attempted Russian crossings. For the next few months, time may be on Russia’s side, after all. But after that, it still favors Ukraine.