It’s in the past, now, but a few concluding thoughts on Prigozhin’s revolt are still in order. Besides, in foreign policy, waiting to speak is a good way of preventing embarrassing errors.
I was at first quite confused, like many, by Prigozhin’s decision to abort his advance. But upon further reflection, both Putin and Prigozhin acted logically. Prigozhin revolted on account of the MoD’s attempt to subsume Wagner, an attempt that enjoyed Putin’s support. That put Wagner’s back against the wall, and Prigozhin’s own brand and power in grave jeopardy.
It’s possible that he did not intend an initial advance toward Moscow. Later reports suggested that Shoigu and Gerasimov were in Rostov for a time. Perhaps he hoped to capture them, and moved on Moscow only upon finding them absent.
It is also likely that he anticipated or hoped for additional military support, especially from Gen. Surovikin, who may have known about the revolt in advance. (He was detained and questioned, but has not otherwise been publicly disciplined.) It is very possible that Putin knew about the revolt in advance, too, and took steps to isolate Surovikin and others deemed dangerous.
Why didn’t Putin take more aggressive action? Because it was very dangerous. The Russian MoD has a monumental military advantage over Wagner, but Putin had good reason to distrust his own forces. And any kind of prolonged military action would have required a partial withdrawal from Ukraine, leading to likely defeat there, and a risk of cascading consequences.
Prigozhin agreed to a deal for similar reasons. It’s possible he could have taken Moscow. Reports suggest that he would not have done so without resistance, but Prigozhin had enough troops and probably an advantage in heavy equipment. But what’s next? Putin would have been long gone, likewise the leaders of the MoD, and Wagner couldn’t go chasing them across Russia. Taking Moscow would only help Prigozhin if it came with an actual takeover of the nation, but he couldn’t do that without buy-in from the military or the rest of the Russian elite. (And they don’t like him.) Besides, any real civil war would have caused defeat in Ukraine—and that’s bad for Prigozhin, too, not just Putin. Prigozhin did not want be the man responsible for that failure, and certainly could not aspire to any kind of Russian leadership after such a disgrace.
The deal, in other words, helped both Putin and Prigozhin. Yes, both are relatively weaker in comparison to their pre-revolt positions; but both are far better off than they would be in the midst of a civil war. An agreement was sensible and rational.
That probably also helps explain the Putin-Prigozhin meeting that took place some days after the revolt. The entire situation is best viewed as a kind of feudal conflict, or gang warfare, or something like that, not a coup in a Western-style state. Prigozhin is a powerful local lord. Putin is the Tsar. Sometimes such lords will revolt, and it’s not effective—or worth the risk—of killing them every time. It’s better to manage them. So Russia increasingly looks pre-Soviet. But Putin isn’t a medieval leader by nature. He prizes stability, and has called treachery the one unforgivable sin, so it is hard to suppose that any reconciliation extends beyond convenience. The future may depend, in part, on whether Putin thinks Prigozhin actually intended to topple him.
There’s one winner here: Aleksandr Lukashenko. It’s not clear whether he played a substantive role in talks, despite his claims, but Wagner has now moved lots of troops and equipment to Belarus. Lukashenko benefits enormously by assuming the role of Prigozhin patron: Wagner presents a barrier to a complete Russian takeover. (Wagner is also now training the Belarusian military—something it sorely needs, though the training might be just for show.) Lukashenko, incidentally, aspired to succeed Yeltsin as primary leader of both Russian and Belarus before Putin one-upped him. I imagine he’ll greatly enjoy any chance to get even.