Imagine that you are Vladimir Putin. This is an unpleasant thing to imagine, probably, but it’s been a good way to think about this conflict so far. It’s fashionable to call him crazy, to imagine a madman. But he isn’t.
On the contrary, Putin has acted in a very logical way, viewed from his standpoint—and he has explained, or at least hinted at, his own logic. As everyone has now learned, he published a long essay called “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” last year, which denied Ukrainian statehood and created a story of Greater Russia that began with Vladimir the Great of Kyiv—and was clearly intended to end with a second Vladimir. Putin, in his own mind, had no choice. If his great ambition was to reunite the three Russias—Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine—time was short. Ukraine was growing stronger every day, bolstered by Western weapons. And Zelensky, who initially seemed like an appeaser (perhaps an incompetent one), proved a skilled negotiator in the 2019 Normandy Format talks on the Minsk agreement. He was clearly not a pro-Russian leader. Putin himself is not immortal, either; he’s 69, and appears paranoid about his health and fading youthfulness. There was no more time. In fact, I think he might do it again, even if he could see how badly it’s gone, though probably with better tactics. No attempt equals automatic failure.
So imagine that you are Putin now. What can you do? You can’t withdraw. If you do, you have failed. Your entire career, your dream of a new Russia, is a failure. You are not Vladimir the Great, part II. A peace agreement is also very dangerous, as long as the Ukrainian government and military remain intact. Ukraine will obtain more and more weapons and may eventually launch a counteroffensive—and could even win. A peace deal is a last resort. You can’t easily attack Western weapons shipments. It would be simplest to attack them on Polish territory, but that’s an attack on NATO. (I do not think Putin will attack NATO. If he does, my theory of a fundamentally rational Putin is wrong.) There is even some risk in Mariupol-style destruction in other cities, like Kyiv. At that point, NATO intervention starts to look possible, and you want to avoid that. Nor can you use nuclear weapons against the West, because you will probably die.
But using tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine—dropped from aircraft, Iskander missiles, cruise missiles, etc.—makes more sense. There’s a high chance it forces a Ukrainian surrender, but a low chance of Western retaliation. Who wants to fight a man who’s already engaged in nuclear war? The cost/benefit analysis looks better than it does for some other options. Fear of the unknown may be the greatest barrier.
This is a horrible decision, and an evil one. Nor is it devoid of risk, either. But Putin already took a bloody gamble. It’s possible to imagine a scenario—much like the initial invasion—in which the risk appears justified by the likely costs and benefits. As a last resort, tactical nuclear strikes could seem more logical than withdrawal or peace.
One wild card here is the complexity of a tactical first strike—the process apparently requires some preparation, as well as cooperation from a number of people. Here’s a really good thread from a Russian nuclear analyst explaining what we know about the process. Someone might refuse, or try to sabotage the strike, especially as I suspect that Putin’s relationship with the Russian military is not improving.
I don’t mean to be alarmist. I don’t think a tactical strike is probable. For now, Russia can continue a slow, though costly, advance with conventional forces. But it is theoretically logical under certain conditions, given Putin’s apparent motivations and previous actions. To quote Sherlock Holmes: “When you have eliminated all which is impossible, then whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.” Nuclear escalation seems highly improbable. But if Putin eventually sees every other choice as impossible, the odds rise.