The return of European great-power politics?
In The National Interest: the effects of Eastern Europe as a military power
Olaf Scholz recently published an essay in the Frankfurter Allgemeine, a leading German newspaper. He argued that Europe needs to assume a new geopolitical “actorness” to combat the Russian threat.
I think his argument is fundamentally flawed in several ways. I explored them earlier this week in this article for The National Interest.
Basically, Scholz doesn’t understand the foundation of power. He still thinks of power as primarily a matter of institutional control or leverage in international decision-making bodies, and seems to ignore the importance of military strength. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the continued relevance of military power much more than the importance of European or even Western unity. People sometimes like to praise the united Western response, and on the whole it’s been better than expected. But Russia has ultimately stalled for a simple reason: Ukraine’s military is better, especially armed with Western equipment. The main takeaway from the war, especially for countries like Poland, will be the need for strong domestic militaries—not a hope for European “actorness” of any kind.
I discuss Poland’s military build-up in the article. It’s remarkable: in ten years, if all goes as planned, Poland will have the best ground forces in Europe (and the largest in the EU—Ukraine will still have more troops). Precisely because this war has demonstrated how much military strength still matters, Europe’s center of power will shift toward the East, a change Britain will likely abet, even if unconsciously (though they should probably do so deliberately). This won’t destabilize the EU, but it may lead to new military competition, and it won’t encourage further integration—not along German or French models, anyway.
The number of Abrams I offered in the article is actually misleading. I said “over 250,” but it’s actually over 350, since Poland is buying over 100 used ones as well.